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The Place of Communism 
in Chinese History: 
Reflections on the Past and Future 
of the People’s Republic of China
Maurice Meisner
I. Introduction
Critics of Mao Zedong often compared the late Chairman to Qin 
Shihuangdi, the First Emperor who in the year 221 B.C. united the vari-
ous feudal kingdoms of ancient China into a centralized empire under 
the Qin dynasty, the first in a long 2000-year line of imperial regimes. 
In traditional Confucian historiography, the First Emperor is portrayed 
as the epitome of the evil and tyrannical ruler—not least of all because 
he burned Confucian books and buried alive Confucian scholars. Mao 
Zedong, in the latter years of his own reign (the 1960s and early 1970s), 
eagerly embraced the historical analogy, praising the First Emperor and 
his Legalist minister Li Si for promoting historical progress in ancient 
China, unburdened by the outmoded traditions of the past. Mao also 
defended the harshness of the First Emperor’s rule (and implicitly his 
own rule) as a model of revolutionary vigilance necessary to suppress 
reactionaries and hasten the progressive movement of history.
Mao Zedong’s self-identification with the First Emperor served to 
reinforce a strong tendency among Western historians to assume an 
essential continuity between China’s long imperial past and its Com-
munist present. The People’s Republic, from this point of view, appears 
as yet another dynasty in a long list of Chinese dynasties, with Mao 
Zedong an emperor in a long line of Chinese emperors; the Commu-
nist bureaucracy as the imperial bureaucracy reincarnated; and Marx-
ism/Mao Zedong Thought, as the official state ideology, functionally 
playing a role similar to imperial Confucianism under the old regime.1
3
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It is no doubt the case that Chinese Communism, if not necessar-
ily the carrier of some traditional Chinese “essence,” is imbued with 
at least aspects or fragments of traditional Chinese thought and cul-
ture. When Mao Zedong called for the “Sinification of Marxism” in 
1938, he suggested more than repackaging Marxism in Chinese wrap-
pings to make it more appealing to Chinese eyes. He also meant mak-
ing the content of Marxism relevant to Chinese historical conditions 
and allowing it to incorporate and inherit all that was valuable in 
the Chinese past. To some degree, then, Chinese Marxism was partly 
“Chinese.” And it is also probably the case that Mao moved closer to 
tradition in his later years, as several scholars have argued.2 In vari-
ous stages of his intellectual and political life, Mao was attracted to 
numerous heroic personalities in traditional Chinese history. Just as 
the young Mao took as his hero the mid-19th-century conservative 
Confucian statesman Zeng Guofan, and Mao the revolutionary looked 
to the heterodox rebel-bandit tradition in Chinese literature, so Mao 
the ruler looked to the strong emperors of the past, especially Qin Shi-
huangdi, the First Emperor, who preceded Mao as one of the two great 
unifiers in Chinese history.
Yet these Communist affinities with traditional history and culture, 
while real enough, appear in what is an essentially post-traditional age. 
To appreciate where Communism stands in the long sweep of Chinese 
history, it is necessary to take into account two fundamental breaks 
with tradition that took place in the first half of the twentieth century, 
one preceding the rise of Chinese Communism, the second coinciding 
with the Communist victory of 1949. Both must be kept in mind in con-
sidering the place of the People’s Republic in Chinese history.
First, there was a crucial break with the Confucian intellectual tra-
dition, a relatively gradual process of alienation from traditional val-
ues that began in the mid-19th century with the Opium Wars and 
the growing Western imperialist impingement. It was the beginning 
of a rupture with tradition that manifested itself in the emergence 
of a modern sense of nationalism in the 1890s (especially after Chi-
na’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95) and then 
found expression in a militant political nationalism during the May 
Fourth period (circa 1919). It was a nationalism that was paradoxically 
accompanied by powerful currents of cultural iconoclasm, a national-
ism that tended more to discard traditional culture than celebrate it. In 
the 1890s, younger members of the gentry-literati-landlord ruling class 
began to lose faith in the utility of old Confucian values. They began to 
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question whether traditional beliefs could save China from the grow-
ing menace of foreign imperialism and rescue China from what was 
increasingly recognized as the country’s terrible backwardness. What 
emerged, most importantly, from this process of alienation from tra-
ditional values was a new standard of judgment to measure the value 
of things both material and spiritual. That new nationalist standard 
of measurement was the wealth and power of China as a nation in 
a Social Darwinian world of rapacious nation-states. What was now 
seen as most important was no longer the preservation of some ancient 
Chinese cultural essence (ti), traditionally conceived in terms of Confu-
cian moral principles, but rather the preservation and strength of the 
Chinese nation, with or without Confucian morality. The standard of 
judgment had changed dramatically.
This new nationalist perspective certainly left open the possibil-
ity of using traditional cultural values for modern nationalist ends. 
But Chinese nationalism also opened the possibility of abandoning, or 
even condemning, the traditional cultural heritage, if old values were 
deemed to be incompatible with the search for national “wealth and 
power.”3
Modern Chinese nationalism, born at the end of the 19th century, 
was amenable to both conservative and radical social ends. It could 
be used equally well in the 20th century by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao 
Zedong. What Chinese nationalism could not do was to maintain any 
real continuity with tradition. It had become a post-traditional Chi-
nese world in which the main value was the preservation and power 
of the Chinese nation, not the preservation of traditional culture. The 
old culture could be celebrated, but only insofar as the celebration 
served modern nationalist ends. The intellectual grounds had shifted 
enormously from the time when what was conceived as the traditional 
cultural essence (ti) was the dominant value, to which all other values 
and beliefs were to be subordinated.
Emerging from a long and painful process of alienation from tra-
ditional values, Chinese nationalism was potentially culturally icono-
clastic as well as amenable to a nationalist celebration of the cultural 
heritage. That iconoclastic potential was realized with a vengeance 
during the New Culture Movement of 1915–19, the opening phase of 
the broader May Fourth Movement. Now a significant number of Chi-
nese intellectuals began to look at the tradition not only as useless for 
the pursuit of modern nationalist ends but morally evil as well, the root 
cause of China’s weakness and its plight in the modern world. Lu Xun, 
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modern China’s most celebrated writer, characterized Chinese history 
as no more than 4,000 years of cannibalism.4 The only remedy was a 
complete transformation of the culture, the consciousness, and the 
psychology of the Chinese people—in effect, a “cultural revolution” 
(wenhua geming), the necessary precondition for meaningful political 
and social change.
But whether modern Chinese nationalists celebrated or condemned 
the cultural tradition, they did so in a post-traditional intellectual uni-
verse where traditional values, while often invoked, were no longer 
relevant to thought and action. This, in brief, was the intellectual break 
with tradition, and it preceded the Chinese Communist revolution by 
nearly half a century. Chinese Communism, it should be emphasized, 
was born and developed in this post-traditional intellectual world.
The second break with tradition was the Maoist revolution itself. The 
Chinese Communist rupture with the Chinese past was a social break, 
not a cultural one. Social revolutions are primarily acts of destruction, 
which permit societies to follow new courses. That is precisely what 
the Communist victory of 1949 signaled, although the new course in 
the end was hardly the one that the victors envisioned. What the Com-
munist Revolution did, most crucially, was to destroy the old scholar-
gentry class, the longest-lasting ruling class in world history, whose 
existence as a social class dated to the late feudal period in ancient 
China (circa the 5th century B.C.), and whose dominance was secured 
by the Qin victory of 221 B.C. and the establishment of the Imperial 
regime. Variously known by the names “gentry,” “landlords,” “schol-
ars,” “literati,” and “officials” (or bureaucrats), this was an exception-
ally powerful ruling class that collectively performed the essential 
economic, political, social, and intellectual functions of traditional Chi-
nese society. The strength and longevity of the “scholar-gentry” class, 
unmatched by any other ruling class in world history, was the social 
basis for the extraordinary continuity of traditional Chinese civiliza-
tion over two millennia.
By the early 20th century, however, with the decline and fall of the 
Qing (the last of the great Chinese dynasties), under pressure from 
the foreign imperialist impingement, the scholar-gentry had largely 
degenerated into a parasitic landlord class, still economically, socially, 
and politically dominant in local rural areas, but no longer able to 
express its interests and authority on a national level. It was the Com-
munist destruction of the remnants of the old gentry-landlord ruling 
class—first in the latter stage of the civil war with the Guomindang 
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(Nationalist Party) in the late 1940s and then in the nationwide land 
reform campaign of 1950–52—that marks the first social revolution in 
Chinese history since the Third Century B.C.
It is not the case, of course, that little changed in China over the 
2000-year period that, for the sake of convenience, we call “traditional 
China;” that is, the long imperial era that began in the 3rd century B.C. 
and concluded early in the 20th century with the feeble republican rev-
olution of 1911. The changes were profound over these centuries, and 
especially so in science, technology, and economic development—the 
very areas in which modern China stagnated and fell so far behind 
the advanced Western capitalist countries. Throughout most of human 
history, and certainly during what is sometimes called “the medieval 
economic revolution” (circa 8th–14th centuries A.D.), China was not 
only the most populous but also the most technologically and econom-
ically advanced country in the world. And between China’s relatively 
advanced material culture and its enormous population, there was an 
intimate relationship. The technological transformation of agriculture 
during these centuries was the basis for the extraordinary growth of 
the Chinese population, which reached nearly 300,000,000 by the 15th 
century, an astonishing figure for pre-modern times. A revolution in 
money and credit stimulated the emergence of a sophisticated proto-
capitalist market economy, a vibrant mercantile class, the world’s most 
extensive and sophisticated commerce, and urbanization on a scale 
known nowhere else in the pre-modern world. These achievements 
can be traced back to (and were made possible by) the unification of 
China in the Third Century B.C.
The once popular notion of an “unchanging China”—a stereotype, 
partly Confucian, partly Hegelian in origin—is, of course, historically 
misleading. In such vital areas of human activity as scientific inquiry, 
technological innovation, economic development in general, and 
urbanization, China’s progress was quite extraordinary over the ages, 
especially during the “medieval” era, probably more impressive than 
any other pre-modern civilization. Yet developments in material life 
did not yield correspondingly innovative changes in traditional social 
and political institutions. There were, of course, important sociopo-
litical changes over the millennia, but they were overshadowed by the 
strong continuities with the social and political orders established in 
the Third Century B.C. Dynasties rose and fell over the millennia, and 
there were long periods of disunity, invasion, and civil war, but the 
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essentials of the imperial political system established by the Qin sur-
vived, as did its social foundation, the scholar-gentry ruling class.
Eventually, over a period of many centuries, the relative absence of 
social and political change began to retard economic and technologi-
cal development. That point was probably reached in the 14th century, 
according to many scholars, more or less coinciding with the estab-
lishment of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), although not necessarily 
because of the Ming. What is particularly striking to scholars of this 
period is the decline and stagnation of technological innovation and 
creativity, which over a period of centuries adversely affected eco-
nomic growth. The reasons for this stagnation are not entirely clear. 
One widely discussed theory is known as “the high-level equilibrium 
trap,” which holds that China had exploited pre-modern technology 
to its economic limits, leaving little room for profitable innovations. 
Quantitative expansion was still possible but qualitative changes were 
severely limited.5
The notion that late traditional China was caught in a “high-level 
equilibrium trap” is perhaps little more than an abstruse way of say-
ing that China failed to develop modern Western-style capitalism and 
failed to experience an industrial revolution. The reasons for the fail-
ures (perhaps a “West-centric” question to begin with) is an old and 
highly controversial matter, most forcefully raised by Max Weber more 
than a century ago.6 According to Weber, while capitalism did develop 
to a substantial degree in traditional China, it was a process that lacked 
the dynamism of its later Western European counterparts. Weber 
attributed the latter to the ascetic values highly favorable to capitalist 
enterprise that were derived from intellectual tensions inherent in the 
beliefs of certain Protestant sects, especially Calvinism. Conversely, as 
negative proof, he argued that such ascetic values were absent in tradi-
tional Chinese thought, especially Confucianism. To avoid misunder-
standing and further oversimplification of a complex and sophisticated 
argument, it should be noted that Weber never argued that religious-
derived values created Western capitalism but only that modern capi-
talism once in existence (due to a multitude of social, economic, and 
technological factors) acquired its extraordinarily dynamic character 
because of ascetic values and a “calculating business mentality” pro-
duced by certain religious beliefs. The absence of such beliefs in China, 
in turn, explains the comparatively weak development of indigenous 
Chinese capitalism.
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While Weber’s argument for “the non-development of capitalism” 
in China, or at least its relative weakness compared to Western Europe, 
is intellectually interesting and historically suggestive, it is perhaps 
more conducive to historical understanding to look to the nature of 
the traditional gentry ruling class rather than the nature of Confu-
cian thought. The gentry were an extraordinarily powerful ruling class 
that monopolized (sometimes within an individual’s lifetime, usually 
within the multigenerational family, and always collectively) the key 
economic, political, social, and intellectual functions in traditional Chi-
nese society. The gentry were economically dominant as landlords in 
a primarily agrarian society, although they sometimes supplemented 
their incomes through commerce, money lending, and the operation of 
local industries. They were intellectually dominant as the literati who 
had mastered the written Chinese language and were the carriers of 
China’s cultural traditions, especially the Confucian ideological tradi-
tion, which sanctified their dominant place in the traditional order. 
Economic and cultural dominance, in turn, yielded political power; 
the bureaucrats who managed the imperial regime were largely drawn 
from the gentry class, ideally through the civil service exam system 
which required a mastery of classical Confucian literature. The gentry 
were socially as well as politically dominant in the rural areas where 
85 percent of the Chinese people lived. It was this monopolization of 
key social functions—economic, political, and intellectual—by a single 
social class that gave the gentry their power and extraordinary longev-
ity as China’s ruling elite for over two millennia.
Reinforcing the longevity and power of the gentry as a conserva-
tive ruling class were two rather unique features of traditional Chinese 
society. First, the gentry were not a hereditary nobility or a closed caste. 
Gentry status was based on a combination (or various combinations) of 
wealth and literacy. It was possible, although difficult, for enterpris-
ing peasants and merchants, for example, to attain gentry status by 
educating a son in the Confucian classics. This would enable him to 
pass the civil service examinations in order to become an official and 
use wealth derived by bureaucratic means to purchase land and raise 
the family to gentry status. A second feature of traditional society was 
a well-developed system of private property in land, a system more 
or less universalized by the Qin unification in the Third Century B.C. 
Most land (although certainly not all land at all times) was alienable; 
that is to say, it could usually be freely bought and sold.
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These features of traditional Chinese society—first, a ruling class 
whose status was not based on heredity privilege and, second, the 
institution of private property in land—were quite unusual attributes 
for a pre-modern society. At first glance it would seem these factors 
should have favored the development of capitalism. In fact, ironically, 
they had profoundly conservative and traditionalist implications. The 
alienability of land meant that wealthy urban merchants and proto-
industrialists could invest their profits in the relative security of the 
agrarian sector and become landlords, rather than invest in the more 
risky business of further expanding their commercial enterprises. Land 
ownership was not only secure and profitable but was also associated 
with great social prestige, that is to say, gentry status. Moreover, since 
gentry social standing (which conferred special social and legal privi-
leges as well as moral and social authority) was theoretically based on 
merit and not heredity (with merit measured by knowledge of Confu-
cian learning and moral precepts), urban entrepreneurs could aspire 
to join the scholar-gentry elite. They would typically do so by educat-
ing their brighter sons to enable them to compete in the civil service 
exams. Or, in the not infrequent times when corruption was rife, they 
could simply buy official degrees and, sometimes, bureaucratic office. 
The result of these tendencies was to encourage the traditional Chinese 
bourgeoisie to merge into the gentry ruling class and the traditional 
social system, rather than to challenge them, as was the general case 
in Western Europe. That in turn not only inhibited the development 
of capitalism but greatly strengthened the power and longevity of the 
gentry ruling class and its Confucian traditions.
The most important social result of the Chinese Communist revolu-
tion was the destruction of the traditional gentry ruling class. It was a 
class that had been in decline since the late 19th century, but one that 
still exercised social, political, and economic dominance in the vast 
rural areas of China, typically in the form of parasitic landlordism. The 
removal of the gentry was the essential precondition for modern eco-
nomic progress, and especially industrialization. That process of class 
destruction was completed during the Land Reform campaign of 1950–
52, during the course of which substantial numbers of gentry were 
killed by angry peasants. But the great majority of the approximately 
20,000,000 members of gentry families (about 4 percent of the popula-
tion) were reduced to ordinary cultivators of the soil, the bulk of their 
landholdings redistributed to poorer peasants. It was this destruction 
of the gentry as a social class that made the Revolution of 1949 not 
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simply a political upheaval but a social revolution, the first in Chinese 
history since the Third Century B.C. That, at least, is one answer to the 
question of the place of Chinese Communism in Chinese history. It 
stands as a fundamental break with a social structure that had existed 
for two millennia.
But if the Maoist victory marked a social revolution, what kind of 
revolution was it? The usual view is that the Communist victory of 
1949 was a socialist revolution, or at least one that moved China in that 
direction. I would suggest, on the contrary, that the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) was never socialist in any meaningful sense of that 
term; that the social nature of the Maoist revolution, and the histori-
cal environment in which it took place, confined post-revolutionary 
society to “bourgeois” limits; and that the present era of massive capi-
talist development is the logical, although perhaps not the necessary, 
outcome of the 1949 Revolution. I will try to pursue these interrelated 
propositions in the remaining pages of this essay, along with a few 
comments on the peculiar nature of Chinese capitalism and its future, 
and do so in an attempt to locate the place of Chinese Communism in 
Chinese history.
II. The Social Nature of the PRC
The social results of great revolutions rarely correspond to either the 
social status of the revolutionaries or their intentions. For example, 
one might consider two of the great revolutions of modern history: the 
17th-century English Revolution and the French Revolution of 1789. 
Both are characterized by many historians as “bourgeois,” or “bour-
geois-democratic,” revolutions, that is, both facilitated the develop-
ment of modern capitalism. Yet in neither revolution did members 
of the actual bourgeoisie play significant roles. Few large merchants, 
industrialists, and bankers were to be found among the 17th-century 
Puritans or among the leaders of the Jacobin Club and the insurgent 
mobs of the French Revolution in the late 18th century. The leaders of 
the English Revolution were largely members of the rural gentry while 
intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals were the most 
prominent figures in the French Revolution. Cromwell’s army was 
mostly composed of dispossessed yeomen while those who stormed 
the Bastille were mostly members of the urban poor. In both revolu-
tions, the demands of the revolutionaries were political, social, and 
sometimes religious. Neither leaders nor masses sought to build a 
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capitalist order; free trade and a market economy were not among 
their demands. The Puritans, after all, wished to “purify” the Church, 
and the universal slogan of the French Revolution was “Liberty, Equal-
ity, Fraternity.”
Yet in broader historical perspective, and quite irrespective of the 
conscious aims of the revolutionary actors, the most important histori-
cal result of both the English and French revolutions was to facilitate 
the development of modern capitalism. The revolutions did so by abol-
ishing remaining feudal prerogatives and doing away with restraints 
on trade and labor, centralizing everything from weights and mea-
sures to the authority of the state, thereby creating a national market, 
and freeing the peasants from feudal obligations so that they could 
engage in commodity production and capital accumulation or become 
urban proletarians. In these and other ways, the English and French 
revolutions served the interests of the bourgeoisie and promoted the 
development of modern capitalism, and thus became historical models 
of a “bourgeois” or “bourgeois-democratic” revolution, although that 
certainly was not the intention of the revolutionaries.
In this functional historical sense, the Chinese Communist Revolu-
tion can also be characterized as a bourgeois, or capitalist, revolution. 
This can be done without the benefit of hindsight that permits us, more 
than half a century after the revolutionary victory, to see the massive 
process of capitalist development that is sweeping China today as the 
outcome of 1949. Even before the “market reforms” undertaken by 
Deng Xiaoping and others in 1978 and after, there were good reasons 
to describe the Maoist victory as a “bourgeois revolution.” It was, of 
course, commonplace in both China and abroad to portray the Com-
munist victory as a “socialist” revolution and Maoist China as a social-
ist society. But it was socialist only in the most superficial sense. What 
the Chinese Communists did was to borrow the Soviet definition of 
socialism as a society in which productive property was mostly state 
owned or state controlled. By that narrow definition, China was social-
ist in 1956, when its leaders claimed it to be so. It was socialist in the 
sense that by the mid-1950s most urban industrial and commercial 
enterprises had been nationalized (either expropriated outright by the 
government or bought by the government at low state-determined 
prices in return for interest-bearing bonds), with their former owners 
often staying on in a managerial capacity. In the countryside, socialism 
was the official result of the agricultural collectivization campaign of 
1955–56. The state did not legally own collectivized agrarian property 
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but effectively controlled it through the organization of production 
by the Communist Party. (The distinction between Party and state in 
China is, of course, a rather thin one.) In any event, by 1956 productive 
private property in both town and countryside had been largely abol-
ished and China was socialist by Stalinist definition.
The Stalinist definition of socialism was woefully inadequate, how-
ever. Indeed, it was a gross distortion of the traditional Marxist concep-
tion, which taught that socialism was a system by which the immediate 
producers (workers and farmers) democratically controlled the condi-
tions and products of their labor. That, of course, was not the system 
that prevailed in China, nor was there any meaningful movement in 
that direction, either in theory or practice, during the Mao period or 
after. China after the mid-1950s might simply be described as a “post-
revolutionary society,” neither socialist nor capitalist, or perhaps, if 
one prefers, a society occupying a halfway position between capital-
ism and socialism. More realistically, post-revolutionary China was a 
country in which the state functioned as a collective capitalist, exploit-
ing workers and peasants and putting the proceeds of their “surplus 
labor” into further investment in the industrial plant. It was a system 
of “capitalism without the capitalists,” as Adam Ulam once character-
ized Communist societies.7
A more fruitful way to look at the historical role of Communism 
in China is to understand Maoism as the vehicle of China’s bourgeois 
revolution, in effect carrying out the historical tasks that the Revolu-
tion of 1911 and the Guomindang sought but failed to achieve in the 
early decades of the twentieth century. As a bourgeois (or capitalist) 
revolution, the victory of 1949 and the first decade of Maoist rule were 
extraordinarily successful. After a long era of political disintegration 
and civil war, genuine national unification was achieved. Following 
more than a century of foreign impingements and invasions, China 
gained true national independence. Independence and national unifi-
cation, in turn, formed the political basis for the creation of a national 
market and for a program of state-sponsored industrialization. About 
these measures there is nothing that can be characterized as socialist. 
They are typical features of the great bourgeois revolutions that have 
yielded modern capitalist economies. Even the Land Reform cam-
paign of 1950–52, the most socially radical measure of the early Mao-
ist regime, fell well within the limits of a bourgeois revolution. Land 
Reform destroyed what remained of the pre-capitalist gentry-landlord 
class, and thus marked the culmination of a great social revolution. It 
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was a capitalist agrarian revolution, however, not a socialist one. The 
social result of Land Reform was a petty bourgeois (or petty capitalist) 
system of individual family peasant proprietorship with peasants free 
to buy, sell, and mortgage land.
In bringing about the reunification of China, in establishing a central 
government that actually governed the vast land, in creating a national 
market free of foreign impingements, and in creating the conditions 
for rapid economic growth and industrialization, the Communists car-
ried out a thoroughgoing bourgeois revolution that earlier 20th-cen-
tury Chinese regimes had attempted—but failed—to achieve. Land 
Reform was a crucial step in this process of “modernization,” for it not 
only brought a degree of socioeconomic equity to the rural popula-
tion but also established a mechanism to channel the agrarian surplus 
into financing urban industrialization. Under the Maoist regime, the 
peasants were still exploited, but the fruits of that exploitation were 
no longer squandered by a parasitic landlord class. Rather, they were 
directed by the state to mostly productive activities. The Communist 
state, however its leaders conceived and described it, functioned essen-
tially as a collective capitalist.
In the early years of the People’s Republic, Mao Zedong frequently 
emphasized the “bourgeois” character and limits of the Communist 
Revolution. It was an emphasis that found theoretical expression in the 
Maoist theory of “New Democracy,” which envisioned for an indefi-
nite length of time the existence of a significant private capitalist sector 
of the economy, albeit one operating under the political auspices of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was not until the late 1950s that 
Mao Zedong, impatient with the sluggish pace of history and seized 
by utopian visions of a China that would be both wealthy and commu-
nist, totally abandoned the restraints that Marxist teachings placed on 
the revolutionary will. The eminently Marxist (and one-time Maoist) 
notion that China must proceed through the Marxian-defined “stages 
of development,” including a lengthy period of capitalist-type devel-
opment in the course of which the material conditions for socialism 
would be created, was denounced as “revisionist” or worse. Accord-
ingly, Mao embarked on the disastrous adventure of the Great Leap 
Forward, whose failures generated the political tensions that culmi-
nated in the destructiveness of the Cultural Revolution.
Despite the political and human disasters of Mao Zedong’s late 
years, China made remarkable economic and material progress dur-
ing the quarter-century of Maoist rule. From 1952, when industrial 
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production was restored to its highest pre-war levels (i.e., 1936–37), to 
the end of the Mao era in 1976, the output of Chinese industry grew 
at an average per annum rate of approximately 11 percent. China was 
transformed from a primarily agrarian nation to an industrial one in 
the sense that industry’s share in the net material product increased 
from 23 to over 50 percent, a rate of industrialization that compares 
favorably with Britain and Japan during comparable stages of modern 
industrial development.8 “In the postwar experience of newly indus-
trializing countries,” Y. Y. Kueh has observed, “probably only Taiwan 
has demonstrated as impressive a record as China in this respect.”9 It 
is not the case, as sometimes assumed, that the Chinese people did not 
benefit from economic growth during the Mao period. Rapid industri-
alization was accompanied by impressive gains in literacy, education, 
and heath care. Most strikingly, and despite the terrible famine that 
issued from the Great Leap, life expectancy nearly doubled over the 
quarter of a century that Mao ruled China, from an average of 35 years 
in the pre-1949 era to 65 years in the mid-1970s.
Yet as the Mao era was drawing to a close in 1976, there was an 
abundance of signs that the once great creative energies of Maoism 
were exhausted and that the Maoist political and economic system 
was moribund. During Mao’s last year, the economy labored under 
the weight of a resumption of the factional political struggles left over 
from the unresolved battles of the Cultural Revolution. There was an 
upsurge in common crime, growing social discontent, popular politi-
cal disillusionment, and a wave of industrial strikes and factory slow-
downs. Agriculture stagnated, and industrial production, which had 
been growing at a per annum rate of 10 percent during the Cultural 
Revolution decade (1966–75), increased by barely one percent in the 
fateful year 1976. Productivity fell in both town and countryside, and 
total production was maintained only by expanding the workforce. It 
was clear that China needed a new course, but a dying Mao Zedong 
and a dogmatized Maoism were incapable of providing fresh initia-
tives.
In retrospect, it seems that it was almost inevitable, and certainly 
historically logical, that post-Mao China would embark on a process of 
capitalist development. The Maoist regime itself had unintentionally 
contributed to the prospect of a capitalist future, in both negative and 
positive ways. The Great Leap, at a terrible human cost, had revealed 
the impossibility of further radical social change in the countryside, 
where a still technologically primitive agrarian economy operated on 
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the bare margins of subsistence even in the best of times. Many peas-
ants still worshipped a deified Mao Zedong but most had lost such 
enthusiasm they once had for collectivized farming and longed for 
their own plots of land to till.
Nor could China’s growing, but still relatively small, urban working 
class provide any sustained impetus for socialism. The proletariat, ter-
rorized into political passivity for the remainder of the revolutionary 
era by the GMD counterrevolution of 1927, also remained politically 
quiescent during the early years of the People’s Republic, its activi-
ties tightly controlled by the CCP and official labor unions. It was 
not until the chaotic conditions created by the Cultural Revolution 
that workers had the opportunity to organize themselves and act on 
their own. While the political effectiveness of the urban working class 
was greatly diminished by deep divisions within its ranks—especially 
between relatively privileged state workers, who enjoyed the security 
of the “iron rice bowl,” and a highly exploited “wandering popula-
tion” of temporary and contract workers—demands for egalitarianism 
and workers’ control of production were soon heard. But the demands 
were denounced as “ultra-leftist” by Maoist ideologues well before the 
Cultural Revolution had run its bizarre course, and the working class 
was again largely condemned to political inaction.
At the same time that the Communist state inhibited political 
expression by the class that Marxist theory identified as the agent of 
socialism, the Maoist regime was unwittingly constructing the mate-
rial conditions that would facilitate the rapid development of capital-
ism, although it did so in the name (and no doubt with the intention) 
of building the foundations for socialism. The unification of China, 
the establishment of a national market, the building of a centralized 
state apparatus and an effective bureaucracy, the construction of a vast 
infrastructure of roads, railroads, and electrical systems, and the edu-
cation of the working population all were measures that could equally 
well serve the construction of a capitalist economy as a socialist one. 
In the end it was capitalism that was built on Maoist foundations, not 
socialism.
The construction of a capitalist order was not the conscious intent 
of the “market reformers” who achieved prominence and power in 
the post-Mao years. Deng Xiaoping, the most important and pow-
erful of the reformers, had been a Communist all his adult life and 
clearly envisioned a socialist future for China, or at least socialism 
as he understood it. However, he was not averse to using capitalist 
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means to achieve ostensibly socialist ends. The goal was rapid eco-
nomic development in the most expedient way possible. If political 
power remained in the hands of the CCP, Deng and the reformers 
assumed that the desired socialist results would more or less automati-
cally follow from “the development of the productive forces,” as the 
ubiquitous phase of the time went.
While the reform program originally was to be a hybrid combining 
“adjustment by the market” with “adjustment by the plan,” it was soon 
discovered that giving the widest latitude to the operation of market 
forces was the quickest way to achieve what was called “socialist mod-
ernization,” a strategy that found its ideological rationale (particularly 
among sympathetic foreign observers) in the dubious notion of “mar-
ket socialism.” The de-collectivization of agriculture in favor of various 
systems of contracting land to individual families soon resulted in a 
de-facto system of private property in land. Job security was abolished 
for workers in state enterprises, throwing them into a capitalist “free 
labor market,” where they were joined by tens of millions of migrant 
workers, mostly redundant peasants who had been forced off the now 
de-collectivized land. Private sectors in both the urban and rural econ-
omies were encouraged, and grew with astonishing rapidity. Foreign 
trade and foreign investment were also encouraged, first in “special 
economic zones” and then throughout China. With the establishment 
of a free labor market, the universalization of the principle of enterprise 
profitability, and the decision to rely on market-determined prices, the 
Communist state created the essential conditions for a capitalist econ-
omy. Within less than a decade the capitalist means of economic devel-
opment had overwhelmed the socialist ends that they were originally 
intended to serve. Indeed, a confusion between means and ends was 
present in the thought of the post-Mao reformers from the outset. “The 
purpose of socialism,” Deng Xiaoping announced in 1980, “is to make 
the country rich and strong.” That certainly was a novel definition of 
socialism, but it was well suited to providing a thin layer of ideological 
veneer to a program of capitalist modernization. Socialism, whatever 
Deng might once have meant by that term, had now been reinterpreted 
to mean the long sought nationalist goal of “wealth and power.” In any 
event, capitalism, not socialism, was the outcome of the Communist 
destruction of the existing social structure.10
This is not the place to seriously discuss the development of capi-
talism that so rapidly followed from the market reforms undertaken 
in the 1980s, perhaps the most massive process of capitalist develop-
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ment in world history. I will only briefly touch upon several closely 
interrelated aspects of this outcome: first, the role of the state in the 
development of capitalism; second, the phenomenon of “bureaucratic 
capitalism” in Chinese history, past and present; and finally, a few brief 
comments on the political and cultural consequences of contemporary 
Chinese capitalism, particularly as it bears on the question of the place 
of Communism in Chinese history.
III. Capitalism and the State
It is one of the great ironies of modern Chinese history that the dynamic 
capitalism that has transformed China over the past quarter of a cen-
tury resulted from decisions that were made by a Communist Party 
and implemented by a powerful Communist state. While incongruous 
in terms of classical Liberal ideology, in historical fact a crucial role 
for the state in the development of capitalism is by no means unusual. 
The Bismarckian state, for example, provided much of the impetus 
and direction for the development of modern industrial capitalism 
in late 19th-century Germany, while state-promoted industrialization 
was the dominant force in the history of Meiji Japan (1868–1912). In 
the so-called “newly industrializing countries” of the post-World War 
II period, state-sponsored capitalist modernization has been universal. 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are among the more successful 
examples.
Indeed, it is not only in cases of late modernization (or what Bar-
rington Moore has termed “conservative modernization”) that the 
state has been involved in promoting capitalist development. State 
power also played an essential role in developing capitalism earlier in 
the Western countries, a role that has been obscured by the ideological 
need to portray capitalism as the natural expression of some essential 
human nature. It is a need that has found expression in the ideology of 
the “free market,” which holds that capitalism operates best when it is 
free of all external governmental impingements. Yet even in England, 
the classic homeland of capitalist development and Liberal ideology, it 
was the intervention of the state that created a labor market, which in 
turn was a precondition for the development of modern industrial cap-
italism. The land enclosures, which promoted rural capitalism while 
driving millions of peasants off the land to eventually be transformed 
into urban proletarians, were not simply the workings of natural eco-
nomic laws but Acts of Parliament enforced by the courts and police. 
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And it was the Poor Law reform of 1834 that finally did away with 
traditional rights of subsistence in favor of a “free labor” market, the 
functioning of which was enforced by the threat of the workhouse. The 
British state was very much involved in creating the necessary condi-
tions for the development of modern industrial capitalism in its very 
homeland and its classic incarnation.11
Yet the role of the Communist state in the development of Chinese 
capitalism has been qualitatively greater than in any earlier case of 
capitalist development. A market economy, after all, presupposes a 
bourgeoisie. In all previous cases of state-promoted capitalism there 
existed indigenous bourgeois classes whose interests the state could 
promote, a bourgeoisie whose numbers could be increased and whose 
energies could be harnessed by state authorities to the task of national 
economic development. But by the late 1950s, the Chinese bourgeoi-
sie (always a relatively small social class) had all but ceased to exist. 
Most of the wealthier members of the bourgeoisie had fled the main-
land in 1949. The commercial and industrial enterprises of those who 
remained were either expropriated outright or bought out by the Com-
munist state. In the latter case, the former owners were given low-pay-
ing (and non-inheritable) government bonds in partial compensation 
for the nationalization of their industrial and commercial enterprises. 
What remained of the bourgeoisie at the end of the Mao era in 1976 
was a small group of aging pensioners collecting modest dividends on 
state bonds. Thus an “entrepreneurial class,” in the terminology of the 
time, had to be created from scratch if the new market strategy of the 
reformers was to be implemented.
It is hardly surprising that this new bourgeoisie was largely recruited 
from the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. Party officials and 
cadres had the political influence and the skills to best take advantage 
of the pecuniary opportunities that the market offered. Overcoming 
such ideological inhibitions as they may have had, many rushed to do 
so, either entering business themselves or, more typically, arranging 
lucrative positions for their children, relatives, and friends in what 
soon became a tangled but highly profitable web of patron-client rela-
tionships. Not only did individual Communist officials (and their fam-
ilies) join the new commercial, financial, and industrial bourgeoisie, 
but whole bureaucracies entered the marketplace in the guise of capi-
talist corporations, not excluding the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
which garnered enormous profits by selling arms on the international 
market and also by operating a chain of luxury hotels and, through its 
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various subsidiaries, some 20,000 industrial, commercial, and financial 
enterprises.12
Thus the marriage of the market to a Communist bureaucracy pro-
duced not a “socialist market economy,” as was once advertised, but 
rather a species of bureaucratic capitalism; that is, a system of politi-
cal economy in which political power is used for private gain through 
capitalist methods of economic activity. The phenomenon in general is 
hardly a novelty in world history. But bureaucratic capitalism has been 
an unusually prominent feature of Chinese history, both in traditional 
and in modern times. Its Chinese origins go back to a former Han 
dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 9) when state monopolies were established for 
the production and sale of such lucrative commodities as salt, wine, 
and iron. Originally operated by Imperial bureaucrats for the purpose 
of generating a stable source of state revenue, the monopolies evolved 
into a hybrid system whereby private merchants managed production 
and distribution under the supervision of high-level bureaucrats. Both 
bureaucrats and merchants profited greatly from this symbiotic rela-
tionship. But it was the officials who usually had the upper hand. The 
officials were relatively secure in their positions, sanctified by tradition 
and ideology, whereas the merchants were dependent on bureaucratic 
patronage.
The state monopolies were not the only way that bureaucrats 
enriched themselves through involvement in capitalist-type activities. 
They also profited from a complex system of official leasing and licens-
ing arrangements under which private merchants and craftsmen were 
compelled to work; various legal and extra-legal powers of taxation 
on commerce and industry; and simple (but usually customarily sanc-
tioned) forms of bribery. Despite the Confucian bias against mercantile 
activities, Confucian bureaucrats did not hesitate to profit from market 
relationships, directly or indirectly.
One of the social consequences of bureaucratic capitalism in tradi-
tional China was that it inhibited the development of the bourgeoisie 
as an independent social class, separate from the bureaucracy. The 
bureaucrats (“scholar-officials” or “gentry,” simply different terms to 
refer to the same social formation) were socially and politically domi-
nant but at the same time they were closely allied with large merchants 
and proto-industrialists. In fact, one can speak of the bureaucrats and 
the traditional bourgeoisie as interdependent classes. The result, as 
the French Sinologist Etienne Balazs has put it, was that “the scholar-
official became ‘bourgeoisified,’ while the merchant’s ambition turned 
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to becoming a scholar-official and investing his profits in land.”13 The 
tendency of private merchants, industrialists, and bankers to become 
absorbed into the bureaucratically dominated economy of imperial 
China meant that an independent bourgeoisie never emerged to seri-
ously challenge the traditional Confucian order.
A new chapter in bureaucratic capitalism unfolded in the late 19th 
century. During the waning years of the Qing dynasty, which had 
been battered by the Western imperialist onslaught since the Opium 
Wars of the mid-19th century, an attempt was made at “conservative 
modernization” to ward off the threat of foreign colonization. The 
modernization effort, known as “the self-strengthening” movement, 
was undertaken by the powerful Chinese provincial viceroys of the 
Manchu regime rather than by the Manchu dynasty itself, which was 
dominated by the obscurantist Empress Dowager. Partially modeled 
on the modernization efforts in Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan, 
the Chinese effort failed, partly because of the absence of a strong and 
effective central government and partly because the foreign imperialist 
impingement was already far along in gaining a stranglehold on the 
Chinese economy. However, in the course of the failure, the provin-
cial viceroys used their official positions to promote a great variety of 
capitalist or quasi-capitalist undertakings from which they amassed 
vast private fortunes. The personification of this early phase of mod-
ern China’s bureaucratic capitalism was Li Hongzhang (d. 1901), who 
occupied the highest political offices in the Empire for three decades, 
during which time he also became China’s largest private capitalist, 
operating (and profiting from) a steamship transportation company, 
arsenals, coal mines, and textile mills, among other enterprises.14
The events immediately preceding and following from the Revolu-
tion of 1911 stimulated a reasonably vigorous and more conventional 
period of capitalist development (circa 1905–1927), which has been 
termed “the golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie.”15 The “golden 
age” was brief, however. The consolidation of power by Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalist (GMD) regime in 1927 gave rise to what is perhaps 
the classic case of bureaucratic capitalism in modern world history. 
The two-decade period that the GMD ruled China was marked by the 
dominance of the “four big families” (sida): the Kung, Soong, Chen, 
and Chiang families. The sida were closely interrelated by politics and 
marriage. By virtue of their control of the GMD party-state apparatus, 
they dominated—in their capacity as private capitalists—much of the 
modern sector of the Chinese economy.
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This system of bureaucratic capitalism ended with the Communist 
victory of 1949, when bureaucratic capitalists (or for that matter all cap-
italists with ties to the Nationalist regime) were expropriated outright 
by the new state while so-called “national capitalists” were bought out 
by the new regime at low state-determined prices. The bourgeoisie as 
a social class ceased to exist in the PRC, although the term “bourgeois” 
(or “bourgeoisie”) lived on in official ideology as a condemnation of 
heterodox political and ideological behavior.
Yet one of the main conditions that fosters bureaucratic capitalism 
survived and indeed was magnified by the Communist political vic-
tory of 1949. It is a historical situation in which social classes are gener-
ally weak and the state is relatively strong. Such was the condition of 
China at the close of the Mao era in 1976, and one of its manifestations 
was the absence of a bourgeoisie. Thus, when state leaders in post-Mao 
China decided that the creation of a market economy was the most effi-
cient way to promote national economic development, they were also 
forced to create a bourgeoisie. This state-fostered bourgeoisie, as we 
have seen, was largely recruited from the CCP, and from the relatives 
and friends of Party officials.
It would be tempting to attribute the contemporary bureaucratic 
capitalist regime to the persistence of old Chinese traditions. After 
all, bureaucratic capitalism, in various guises, was a prominent fea-
ture of Chinese history from the Han dynasty through the GMD era. 
Yet it seems difficult to link bureaucratic capitalism in the post-Mao 
era to its earlier incarnations. The Revolution of 1949 constituted a 
fundamental break with both the social and political structures of the 
past, and it is difficult to identify any meaningful continuities that 
connect pre-1949 and post-1979 China. Moreover, bureaucratic capital-
ism in contemporary China has been associated with extremely high 
rates of national economic growth, which has made China the world’s 
second largest economy (as measured by purchasing power parity). 
This stands in striking contrast to bureaucratic capitalism in tradi-
tional and early modern China, which often, especially in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, was associated with general economic stagnation 
(although the bureaucratic capitalists prospered). This suggests that 
factors other than the origins and nature of the bourgeoisie are crucial 
for determining the rate of economic growth. In the case of China, the 
contrast between the stagnant bureaucratic capitalism of the Guomin-
dang period and the dynamic bureaucratic capitalism of the post-Mao 
PRC can be better explained by such factors as the 1950–52 land reform 
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campaign (and the consequent ability to channel the agrarian surplus 
into industrial development), a far more unified nation-state with a 
relatively well-developed infrastructure, and a much more favorable 
position in the global capitalist economy by an independent and strong 
Chinese nation-state.
The relationship between bureaucratic capitalism and economic 
growth has varied enormously from country to country, and indeed 
within the same country, as has been the case in China in different 
historical eras. It is not a matter that lends itself to easy conclusions 
or broad generalizations. On the other hand, the political and cultural 
implications of contemporary Chinese capitalism seem fairly clear. A 
few words might be ventured about these topics by way of conclusion.
IV. Capitalism and Political Democracy
The association of capitalism with political democracy, and the belief 
that a capitalist economy naturally produces a democratic political 
system, largely derive from the experience of countries where modern 
capitalism developed early, especially England, France, and the United 
States. Yet even in economically advanced countries, the construction of 
a democratic political regime has been a lengthy and tortuous process. 
For example, in France, the homeland of the classic bourgeois-demo-
cratic (or capitalist) revolution, it was not until the Third Republic in 
1871, nearly a century after the great Revolution of 1789, that a viable 
political democracy was established. Monarchical restorations, dicta-
torships, and failed revolutions filled the intervening years.
In countries where industrial capitalism developed relatively late, 
the modernization process typically has taken place under the guid-
ance of a relatively autonomous and authoritarian state, whose social 
basis is an alliance between a landed aristocracy that has turned to 
commercial pursuits and a modern bourgeoisie that is still too weak 
to rule on its own. Consequently, democratic institutions and tradi-
tions are weak and the state is strong. Indeed, in both Bismarckian 
Germany and Meiji Japan, the two most notable cases of late capitalist 
modernization, the eventual political outcome was fascism. In these 
and many other cases in which fascist or highly authoritarian politi-
cal regimes resulted, the nascent bourgeoisie, as Moore has phrased 
it, exchanged “the right to rule for the right to make money.”16 The 
authoritarian state, for its part, attempts to create conditions favor-
able to the development of urban and rural capitalism, supporting, 
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for example, repressive labor policies that aim to extract an ever larger 
surplus from the working population, especially in the rural areas. But 
the conscious aim of state leaders is not so much to promote capitalism 
as to pursue the eminently nationalist goals of building industrial and 
military power in order to catch up with the more advanced capitalist 
countries.
It seems to me that China, in the post-Mao era, has been pursuing a 
variant of this “conservative route to modernization.” A powerful and 
autonomous state apparatus is one of the legacies of the Mao period 
that has been preserved by the post-Mao market reformers. That state 
has been employed by Mao’s successors to sweep away all social and 
ideological barriers to rapid capitalist development, especially “social-
istic” institutions constructed during the Mao period. In the country-
side, collectivistic and cooperative work units (along with much of the 
rural health and welfare systems) have been dismantled in order to 
create a commercialized rural economy. In the cities, the so-called “iron 
rice bowl” of job security and welfare benefits enjoyed by about half of 
the urban working class during the Mao years has been broken in the 
name of “reform.” In both town and countryside these market reforms 
have facilitated a more intensive exploitation of the working popula-
tion, the real secret of the Chinese economic miracle. Both the state 
and the state-created bourgeoisie have benefited from this process of 
intensive exploitation. And as in virtually all cases of “modernization,” 
it is the peasants who are the principal victims of economic progress. 
In China, the most visible manifestation of the price of moderniza-
tion is the growing “floating population” (youmin) of migrant laborers. 
Several hundred million redundant peasants have been forced off the 
land and wander around the country to find temporary work, often at 
construction sites; they have little choice but to labor for pitiful wages 
and endure miserable conditions of life.
To greater or lesser degrees, these are common features of capitalist 
development in general and late “conservative modernization” in par-
ticular. What is unique in the case of China is that the social basis of the 
modernizing state—a bourgeoisie and commercialized rural class—
had to be created by the state itself. It was the Communist state that 
undertook the task of breeding both an urban and a rural bourgeoisie, 
largely from within its own ranks. In this sense, the Chinese model of 
conservative modernization is even more statist and bureaucratic in 
character than were its German and Japanese predecessors. And the 
prospects for a democratic political evolution are even less promising. 
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It seems most unlikely that a bourgeoisie that is so dependent on the 
Communist state, indeed in many respects still psychologically and 
materially tied to the Party-state apparatus, will promote a movement 
to limit the power of a state from which it benefits so greatly.
V. Capitalism and the Chinese Tradition
Bureaucratic capitalism in contemporary China is still capitalism in its 
essential workings, however peculiar its origins. Like all processes of 
capitalist development, the Chinese version is profoundly subversive 
of tradition. No force in history has dissolved sacred beliefs and vener-
ated cultural practices as rapidly and profoundly as capitalist forces 
of production. Karl Marx, more than a century-and-a-half ago, in cel-
ebrating the astonishing productive powers of capitalism, perhaps best 
described its cultural implications:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and 
with them the whole relations of society… . Constant revolutionizing of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlast-
ing uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all 
earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient 
and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed 
ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into 
air, all that is holy is profaned.17
In this passage, and even more so in the longer passage of which this 
quotation is a part, Marx captures the dynamic and frenetic character 
of capitalism in a way that is no less relevant to our day than it was to 
his. He both celebrates and laments the dissolution of ancient beliefs 
and sanctified traditions under the relentless pressure of capitalist 
development. He anticipates the world of perpetual flux, upheaval, 
and fragmentation that today is described by such terms as “modern-
ism,” “modernization theory,” and “globalization.”
No country has experienced a more massive and more rapid pro-
cess of capitalist development than has China over the past quarter 
of a century. Just as capitalism is sweeping the vast land, so what 
remains of traditional beliefs and structures are disintegrating with 
equal rapidity. The Confucian tradition has been eroding for a long 
time, ever since the lengthy and painful transition from “culturalism 
to nationalism” in the late 19th century and the virulent cultural icono-
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clasm of the May Fourth era. These were followed by the Maoist revo-
lution of 1949, which destroyed the scholar-gentry class that had for so 
long been the social carrier of traditional values and culture. Yet at no 
time has there been so rapid and so radical a rupture with traditional 
culture as the one we are witnessing today, as China submits to, and 
indeed embraces, the relentless and coldly universal imperatives of 
the world capitalist market. The remnants of tradition are drowning in 
what Marx called capitalism’s “icy waters of egotistical calculation.”18 
The traditions linger on only in the form of commodities, as objects on 
display in the silence of museums, and as grotesque exhibits in Disney-
land-like theme parks, where they can be viewed by foreign and Chi-
nese tourists for the price of an admission ticket. Thus, China shares 
with other modern nations that most non-Confucian feeling—the loss 
of any real sense of tradition.
It is one of the great ironies of Chinese history that Communism has 
been the historical agent to usher in modern capitalism. And capital-
ism, in turn, has concluded in the century-long iconoclastic assault on 
the Confucian tradition, uprooting and dissolving the vestiges of tradi-
tional culture. Even as the Communist regime substitutes a nationalist 
celebration of the millennial Chinese tradition (in the form of “Confu-
cian institutes,” for example) in place of its once revolutionary ideol-
ogy, that tradition is melting away under the torrid development of 
the capitalist forces of production that Communist leaders have been 
promoting since 1978. •
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